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Action observation and execution: What is shared?
F. de Vignemont
CNRS-EHESS-ENS, Paris, France
P. Haggard
University College London, London, UK
Performing an action and observing it activate the same internal representations of action. The
representations are therefore shared between self and other (shared representations of action, SRA). But
what exactly is shared? At what level within the hierarchical structure of the motor system do SRA
occur? Understanding the content of SRA is important in order to decide what theoretical work SRA
can perform. In this paper, we provide some conceptual clarification by raising three main questions: (i)
are SRA semantic or pragmatic representations of action?; (ii) are SRA sensory or motor representa-
tions?; (iii) are SRA representations of the action as a global unit or as a set of elementary motor
components? After outlining a model of the motor hierarchy, we conclude that the best candidate for
SRA is intentions in action, defined as the motor plans of the dynamic sequence of movements. We shed
new light on SRA by highlighting the causal efficacy of intentions in action. This in turn explains
phenomena such as inhibition of imitation.
INTRODUCTION
In 1992, researchers in Parma reported the
existence of neurons that fired both when a
monkey was grasping a peanut and when it was
watching the experimenter grasping it. They
named them ‘‘mirror neurons’’ because they
reflect other people’s actions (di Pellegrino,
Fadiga, Fogassi, Gallese, & Rizzolatti, 1992;
Gallese, Fadiga, Fogassi, & Rizzolatti, 1996;
Rizzolatti, Fadiga, Gallese, & Fogassi, 1995). In
humans, action observation and action execution
activate overlapping brain areas including the
supplementary motor area, the dorsal premotor
cortex, the supramarginal gyrus, the superior
parietal lobe and the Broca’s area (Grezes &
Decety, 2001). It was therefore argued that the
same internal representations of action is shared
between self and other (shared representations of
action, SRA).
By linking self and others within a unique
representational framework, SRA have been con-
sidered to be at the core of intersubjectivity
(Gallese, 2003), potentially playing a role in imita-
tion (Iacoboni et al., 1999), empathy (Preston & de
Waal, 2002), mindreading (Gallese & Goldman,
1998), and language (Rizzolatti & Arbib, 1998).
According to Ramachandran (2004), mirror neu-
rons had even been a necessary condition for the
so-called ‘‘big bang’’ of human evolution 40,000
years ago*a sudden explosion of human mental
abilities and culture including even art and mathe-
matics. SRA could indeed parsimoniously solve
several problems raised by interpersonal relation-
ships by enabling direct matching between self and
others.
However, SRA might not provide such a
universal answer, as shown by some recent
criticisms both on the empirical and on the
conceptual sides (Gre`zes & Decety, 2001) about
# 2008 Psychology Press, an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa business
Correspondence should be addressed to: Frederique de Vignemont, Institut Jean-Nicod, CNRS-EHESS-ENS, 29 rue d’Ulm,
75005 Paris, France. E-mail: fvignemont@isc.cnrs.fr
SOCIAL NEUROSCIENCE, 2008, 3 (34), 421433
www.psypress.com/socialneuroscience DOI:10.1080/17470910802045109
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
de
 V
ig
ne
mo
nt
, 
Fr
éd
ér
iq
ue
] 
At
: 
09
:2
4 
3 
No
ve
mb
er
 2
00
8
the link with language; Saxe (2005) about the link
with simulation theory; Jacob & Jeannerod (2005)
about the link with mindreading). After the
excitement of the discovery of SRA and their
possible consequences for social cognition, there
is a need for clarifications and conceptual cau-
tiousness. As a preliminary step, it is necessary to
understand what is indeed shared between action
execution and action observation. Only if we
know in detail the content of SRA can we decide
what work SRA can perform. In particular, we
need to situate SRA within the architecture of
action. Both cognitive and neural models identify
many representational stages and processes which
contribute to action execution (Jeannerod, 1997;
Wolpert, Ghahramani, & Jordan, 1995). At what
level within the hierarchical structure of the
motor system do SRA occur? The aim of this
paper is to step back from speculation about the
possible roles of SRA and to start at the begin-
ning by asking: what is shared?
DIFFERENT LEVELS OF ACTION
REPRESENTATIONS
The hypothesis of SRA can be articulated as
follows:
1. Two tokens of the same type of action
representation are activated in two indivi-
duals’ brains.
2. The activation in one individual is triggered
by the observation of the other individual
acting.
Both claims raise questions, but most recent
interest has focused on the latter claim. How is
the observation of the performed movement
related to the activation of SRA? Is the relation-
ship direct or not (Csibra, 2007)? Does it result
from an associative learning mechanism (Heyes
and Bird, 2007)? In contrast, we will focus here on
the former claim of the SRA hypothesis: what
kind of action representation is instantiated both
in the agent and in the observer?
SRA are defined relative to their context of
activation (execution versus observation), but
these two notions are too broad to be useful.
According to Anscombe (1957), there is an
almost infinite list of possible descriptions of the
same action: I turn the tap clockwise, I open the
tap, I get some water, I intend to drink. Similarly,
at the computational level, the goal of the action
is represented at different levels of complexity
that are hierarchically organized (i.e. a set of
motor commands, a series of intermediary move-
ments, the final outcome) (Wolpert, Doya, &
Kowato, 2003). The contextual definition of SRA
is not sufficient to define what level of action
representation one has access to when observing
someone else’s movement. Exactly what informa-
tion is shared? We need to take account of the
complexity of the motor system to be able to
specify what is common between action execution
and action observation.
We begin by considering whether SRA could
be localized to the upstream, intentional motor
system. There are at least two kinds of intention
(Pacherie, 2000; Searle, 1983). Prior intentions
represent the goal of the action as a global unit
(e.g. I intend to drink). They are too rough-
grained to specify the movements that have to be
performed. There may be several means to realize
the same prior intention. The motor system needs
to anchor the prior intention in a specific context
and to determine the means that will be required
to reach the goal, that is, the intention in action.
Intentions in action represent the action as a
dynamic sequence of specific movements (e.g.
I intend to reach the tap and to turn it clockwise
with the right hand). They initiate the action,
guide it and monitor its effects. They correspond
to the motor plan, prior to the dispatch of the
final motor command to the muscles (Jeannerod,
1995). The intention in action therefore has a
level of motor specificity that prior intentions
lack. For this reason, intentions in action can be
identified with the inverse model in computa-
tional frameworks. The inverse model has the role
of computing the motor commands needed to
achieve the desired state given the agent’s current
body state (Wolpert et al., 1995). The motor
system also anticipates both the motor and the
sensory consequences of the movement through
two kinds of forward model (Frith, 2005; Wolpert
et al., 1995). The forward dynamic model predicts
what an action will be like given the specific body
that executes the motor commands (e.g. how far
the arm will stretch given its size). The output of
the forward dynamic model is encoded in a motor
format. It is involved in motor imagery and allows
anticipatory control of movements. For example,
we need to anticipate the changing gravitational
forces when we move a heavy object up and
down, and thus to alter the grip force. The
forward output model predicts the sensory feed-
back (e.g. where the arm will be at the end of the
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movement). The output of the forward output
model is encoded in a sensory format. The
prediction of the sensory consequences of the
movements attenuates the actual sensations
caused by the movements (Blakemore, Wolpert,
& Frith, 1998). This is why one cannot tickle
oneself. Finally, there is the actual sensory feed-
back resulting from the execution of the action.
Controlling actions requires running the different
stages in an open-loop fashion. We may however
want to freeze the action system at a moment in
time, and ask whether the individual representa-
tions one finds might or might not be shareable.
In summary, SRA may happen at different
levels: prior intention, intention in action, motor
command, predicted motor outcome, predicted
sensory outcome, and sensory feedback. These
possibilities are not mutually exclusive. However,
most of the neuroscience literature about SRA
does not distinguish clearly among these levels.
The authors sometimes refer to intentions
(Iacoboni et al., 2005), but without distinguishing
prior intentions and intentions in action. Other
authors suggest sharing of the predicted state
resulting from the forward output model (Prinz,
2002). Still others include a further level of action
representation, the semantic knowledge of what
one does (Van Elk, Van Schie, & Bekkering,
2007).
Figure 1 concerns processes and signals, and is
based on information engineering. In contrast,
most conceptual work on SRA describes repre-
sentations in terms of their functions (see Figure
2). In order to situate these representations within
process models, we suggest that three questions
about SRA are essential.
1. Are SRA semantic or pragmatic representa-
tions of action?
2. Are SRA sensory or motor representations?
3. Are SRA representations of the action as a
global unit or as a dynamic sequence of
elementary motor components?
Basic as they might seem, these questions are
not easy to answer, as we will see. The past 15
years have seen an increasing number of studies
about the relationship between perception and
action, which sometimes provide conflicting re-
sults. This paper does not aim to review this vast
amount of literature, but rather to suggest some
answers based on a few key studies.
SEMANTIC VERSUS PRAGMATIC
According to the generality constraint (Evans,
1983), I master the concept ‘to grasp’ if I am able
to use it to represent both that I grasp a peanut/a
glass of water and that John grasps a peanut/a
glass of water (Bx grasps y). Such definition of
concepts meets the underlying requirement of
SRA. And indeed, SRA have been said to encode
a ‘‘motor vocabulary’’ shared between self and
others (Rizzolatti et al., 1988). In favour of such a
view, it was found that Broca’s area contributes to
action observation and imitation (Iacoboni et al.,
1999; Koski et al., 2002). SRA would provide a
conceptual understanding of action (Rizzolatti,
Fogassi, & Gallese, 2000). However, as pointed
out by Goldman (2006), the same authors also
describe SRA as a kind of ‘‘direct experien-
tial understanding’’ of someone else’s actions
(Gallese, Keysers and Rizzolatti, 2004, p. 396;
emphasis added). They emphasize that ‘‘Concep-
tual reasoning is not necessary for this under-
standing.’’ There is an apparent contradiction
Sensory representation
Prior intention 
Predicted motor 
outcome
Inverse model
Sensory
feedback
Forward 
dynamic model
Forward 
output model
ACTION
Motor command 
Intention in action 
Predicted sensory 
consequences
Motor representation
Figure 1. Hierarchical model of motor control.
Action representations 
Semantic  Pragmatic  
SensoryMotor
Primitive 
embodied 
movements  
Sequence of 
movements partly 
‘disembodied’ 
Intention in 
action
Motor
command
Predicted
sensory
consequences
(a)
(c)
(b)
Action as a 
global unit 
Prior intention
Figure 2. What is the content of SRA?
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here. On the one hand, the relationship between
action observation and execution would be
mediated by conceptual processes. On the other
hand, it would be immediate, leading to a direct
experience of someone else’s action from a first-
person perspective as if one were moving.1
The best way to capture the difference
between these two views may be to use the
distinction between semantic and pragmatic rep-
resentations of action, as defined by Jeannerod
(1994). Semantic representations encode the
properties of the observed actions to identify
them, and to keep track of them. They are based
on visual recognition expertise and they are
linked to linguistic representations (e.g. action
naming tasks), and to a wider semantic network
of other concepts connected with the recognized
action. This knowledge is from a third-person
perspective. The observer does not put herself in
the agent’s shoes; she remains an external witness.
In contrast, pragmatic representations represent
actions from the first-person point of view of the
agent in interaction with the world. They encode
the properties of the motor system for optimiza-
tion of action execution, as well as the properties
of the object relevant for the interaction between
the agent and the object. They allow the obser-
ver to reproduce the same movement through
imitation.
This leads us to our first question. Are SRA
semantic or pragmatic representations of actions?
Like any semantic knowledge, action knowledge
can be indifferently applied both to the self and to
others. However, if the sharing were limited to
conceptual recognition, there would be no parti-
cular interest in SRA. I would understand other
people’s actions in the same way that I under-
stand the movements of the clouds in the sky: in
both cases, I apply a semantic knowledge pre-
viously acquired. Alternatively, one may argue
that what makes SRA special is that they go
beyond this mere conceptual sharing. One would
not share only the knowledge about the action;
one would share the agent’s inner perspective.
SRA would then allow the observer to internalize
someone else’s actions as if she were the agent,
and not just an external witness.
Recent behavioral results have shown the
influence of semantic representations on action,
suggesting that one could have semantically
mediated SRA (Gentilucci & Gangitano, 1998;
Gentilucci, Benuzzi, Bertolani, Daprati, & Gang-
itano, 2000; Glover & Dixon, 2002; Glover,
Rosenbaum, Graham, & Dixon, 2004). For ex-
ample, Gentilucci & Gangitano (1998) found a
priming effect of action words on movement
kinematics. Subjects had to grasp two bars of
the same size, one named ‘small’ and the other
named ‘large’. The grip aperture was influenced
by the tag on the bar. More recently, Van Elk and
coworkers have produced several results suggest-
ing a role of conceptual representations of action
in mirror phenomena, and thus supporting a
semantic view (Van Elk et al., 2007; Lindemann,
Stenneken, van Schie, & Bekkering, 2006). Sub-
jects grasped and used one of two objects (cup or
magnifying glass) if the word subsequently pre-
sented was lexically valid (go) or withheld from
moving if a nonword was presented (no-go). Two
kinds of words were presented: either congruent
or incongruent with the action to perform (e.g.
mouth or eye). Subjects responded faster when
the word was congruent. The authors showed an
interaction effect between action preparation and
word reading.
These interesting results underline the impor-
tance of our conceptual knowledge for actions.
They show that action execution is sensitive not
only to action observation, but also to action
words. However, they do not show that the
pathway between perception and action is always
mediated by the semantic knowledge of acts.
These results do not show that we are sensitive
exclusively to conceptual representations of ac-
tions. Nor do they show that what is shared is only
semantic knowledge. There might additionally be
a direct pathway between observation and action,
relying only on shared pragmatic representations
of action. But how can these two putative
representations be untangled?
The distinction between semantic and prag-
matic representations of action raises a real
difficulty for neuroscience. How can brain
imagery studies or cell recording differentiate
between pragmatic representations from a first-
person perspective and semantic representations
from a third-person perspective? A recent study
tackles this issue by using motor and visual
expertise to differentiate between first-person
and third-person perspective (Calvo-Merino,
Grezes, Glaser, Passingham, & Haggard, 2006).
1 Gallese & Lakoff (2005) provide an embodied account of
concepts, which would erase the contradiction. However, for
various reasons, we prefer to maintain a distinction between
the experiential nonconceptual level and the conceptual level.
Nonetheless, we agree that the nonconceptual level can
ground the conceptual level.
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Ballet dancers, both male and female, watched
short videos of ballet movements. The move-
ments chosen were either performed exclusively
by male dancers, performed exclusively by female
dancers, or common to male and female. The
underlying assumption was that dancers have
visual familiarity for all the movements, but
only motor familiarity for movements of their
own gender. If there was nothing more to SRA
than a mere semantic representation of dance,
then there should not be any difference between
the conditions. However, this was not the case:
mirror system activity was greater when subjects
watched movements specific to their own gender,
for which they had acquired the appropriate
motor representations. Questionnaire data and
brain activity suggested that semantic knowledge
of the different movement types, such as visual
recognition and naming, did not differ between
the groups. This study provides a conclusive
argument in favor of the existence of pragmatic
representations of action shared between self and
others.
To sum up, although semantic representations
can affect action execution, semantic representa-
tions do not suffice to account for all the data and
pragmatic representations also seem to be in-
volved. It remains however an open question
whether semantic representations are necessary
or not, although they are not sufficient. It has
been proposed recently a dual-route model: the
link between sensory and motor can be either
direct (through associative learning mechanism
for instance) or linguistically mediated (Heyes,
2001; Tessari and Rumiati, 2004). Similarly, the
direct matching hypothesis assumes that we do
not need semantic mediation (Gallese et al.,
2004). On these views, SRA seem to involve
sharing of a nonconceptual, nonsemantic, prag-
matic form of representation from a first-person
perspective based on the representations that
agents have of executing actions.
SENSORY VERSUS MOTOR
We have shown that the relationship between
action observation and action execution is not
always mediated by semantic representations of
action. There is, in addition, a direct link between
perception and action, which does not require a
conceptual translation from one to the other.
Such direct matching is possible if and only if
some levels in the perceptual process and in the
motor process are commensurate. But what code
is common to perception and action? Is it sensory:
‘‘actions are represented at the common meeting
place in terms of their sensory or perceptual
consequences’’ (Prinz, 2002, p. 173)? Or is it
motor: ‘‘the perceptionaction mediation relies
on motor representations that are already acti-
vated (or formed) during observation’’ (Decety
and Grezes, 1999, p. 177)?
The content of SRA is shown in Figure 2;
sensory versus motor sharing is depicted in
Figure 3.
According to the sensory view, the observation
of a kinematic pattern is directly matched with
the anticipation of the sensory consequences of
the action. The anticipatory image of the sensory
feedback of actions is associated in a bidirectional
way with the actions that lead to them (effect U
movement). Its activation thus in turn activates
the motor representation of the corresponding
action. The mechanism of SRA is sensory, but the
indirect consequence is that two people have
common motor representations. The sensory
common coding view can explain a number of
studies based on interference between execution
and action observation. The interference arises
because of the similarity between the sensory
representations of the movement observed and
the movement predicted.
In contrast, according to the motor view, action
observation triggers a covert simulation of the
motor program (Gallese, 2003; Jeannerod, 1994).
A meta-analysis of brain imaging studies has
shown an overlap of activations between execu-
tion, observation and mental simulation of action
(Gre`zes & Decety, 2001). To put it another way,
motor imagery is the conscious counterpart of
SRA (Decety, 2002), and might be considered as
(a) (b)
Sensory representation 
of the predicted 
consequences 
Motor command 
Motor command 
ACTION 
AGENT
Sensory representation 
of the predicted 
consequences 
OBSERVER
Motor output 
Sensory
consequences 
ACTION 
Motor output 
Sensory
consequences 
SRA
Figure 3. (a) Sensory sharing versus (b) motor sharing.
ACTION OBSERVATION AND EXECUTION: WHAT IS SHARED? 425
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
de
 V
ig
ne
mo
nt
, 
Fr
éd
ér
iq
ue
] 
At
: 
09
:2
4 
3 
No
ve
mb
er
 2
00
8
the key for understanding SRA.2 However, the
activation of the motor program in turn activates
also the representation of the sensory conse-
quences.
In addition, there may be several intermediate
positions between a purely sensory view and a
purely motor view (Hommel et al., 2001; Keysers
& Perrett, 2004). How might one dissociate
sensory and motor components? Indeed, is it
possible to do so? One possibility is to look at
the neural network underlying SRA. It includes
areas that are classically considered motor (e.g.
ventral premotor cortex). This observation
formed part of the original interest of SRA:
perceptual tasks activate motor areas. However,
both the sensory view and the motor view can
account for such activation. In both views, both
sensory and motor components of action repre-
sentations are activated by action observation,
whether it is directly or indirectly triggered by the
representation of the sensory consequences.3
Consequently, it may be illusory to dissociate
the sensory and the motor aspects. They are
bound together into united ‘‘action files’’, which
group together all the action-related features,
both perceptual and motor (Hommel, 2004).
What is shared would be the event file itself,
and not its perceptual or its motor components.
However, it is possible to dissociate somato-
sensory and motor components of action mirror-
ing in the cortex (Avenanti, Bolognini, Maravita,
& Aglioti, 2007). Those authors investigated
observation of possible and impossible move-
ments. Both classes of movement induce activa-
tions of mirror system areas thought to contain
SRA (Costantini et al., 2005), and motor facilita-
tion effects (Romani, Cesari, Urgesi, Facchini, &
Aglioti, 2005). However, Avenanti and coworkers
showed that repetitive transcranial magnetic sti-
mulation (rTMS) over ventral premotor cortex
abolishes the motor facilitation effect during the
observation of biologically possible movements,
but not impossible movements. On the other
hand, rTMS of primary somatosensory cortex
decreases the motor facilitation effect during
observation of biologically impossible, but not
possible movements. This study thus dissociates
two aspects of the motor facilitation effect. Only
the first of these, which is specialized for biolo-
gical action, and housed in ventral premotor
cortex, can properly be considered to reflect the
functions of the mirror system.
In addition, a few recent results argue in favour
of sharing motor representations. Mirror neurons
have been shown to fire even if the completion of
the action is hidden behind a screen (Umilta`
et al., 2001). To put it another way, one does not
need to perceive the outcome of the action to
activate SRA. This result is not sufficient in itself
to argue against the sensory view. One might
indeed still be able to make sensory predictions
about the action output, although it has not been
completed. However, a recent perceptual study
has shown the influence of motor expertise on
action observation independently of any visual
expertise (Casile & Giese, 2006). Blindfolded
subjects learned to perform a novel coordinated
movement based only on verbal and haptic feed-
back. The better they were at performing the
movement, the better they were at recognizing it
on a point-light display. The authors concluded
that motor programs might be the dominating
factor that explains the influence of motor train-
ing on movement recognition.4
Even more convincing evidence against the
sensory view comes from results showing context
dependence of SRA. If SRA represented the
sensory consequences of the action, then their
activation should be specific to the sensory
consequences. They should not be directly af-
fected by the context leading to the movement,
since context does not modify the sensory con-
sequences. However, Fogassi et al. (2005) showed
that some mirror neurons responded differen-
tially, depending on the kind of action in which
the movement was embedded (e.g. grasping for
eating versus grasping for placing). Although the
sensory consequences were the same, the neural
activation was not. The same type of results was
found in humans (Iacoboni et al., 2005). The
2 However, as far as we know, there is no study that directly
investigates the relationship between motor imagery and
action observation.
3 In order to untangle these two alternatives, one would
need better neuroimaging tools that allow for a better
temporal resolution (e.g. EEG and MEG) or an analysis of
the effective connectivity (e.g. by dynamical causal modeling).
This would permit one, for example, to determine what comes
first: the representation of the sensory consequences or the
motor representation.
4 Once again, this study cannot exclude completely a
possible role of the anticipation of the sensory consequences
of the movement. Although subjects never had any visual
feedback on the movement they learned, they might have
predicted the visual consequences of their movement.
Alternatively, there may be some intermodal translation
from haptic to vision (Meltzoff, 1995).
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authors found differential activation of the right
inferior frontal cortex relative to the context, the
physical movement remaining the same. Conse-
quently, the mere representation of the sensory
outcome of the action cannot exhaust the content
of SRA, as it is identical in both conditions. What
matters here is the representation of the sur-
rounding context.
In summary, (i) the lack of visual representa-
tion of the outcome does not prevent the activa-
tion of SRA (Casile & Giese, 2006; Umilta` et al.,
2001), and (ii) the observation of the same out-
come can lead to different activation of SRA
(Fogassi et al., 2005; Iacoboni et al., 2005). Since
SRA are therefore unlikely to be sensory repre-
sentations, they may instead be motor representa-
tions. Of course, motoric SRA might then activate
sensory representations of the expected outcome
indirectly, but our concern here is with direct
sharing. Our suggestion of purely motoric SRA is
consistent with Jeannerod’s view that ‘‘an obser-
ver monitoring an action performed by someone
else is never far from being also the agent of that
action’’ (Jeannerod, 2003, p. 142).
ACTION AS A GLOBAL UNIT VERSUS
ACTION AS A DYNAMIC SEQUENCE OF
ELEMENTARY MOTOR COMPONENTS
We have seen that although both sensory and
motor representations might be shared, the evi-
dence favours sharing of motor representations
over sensory ones. However, there are several
possible levels of motor representations. Two
factors must be considered to untangle the
different levels within the motor system.
First, the degree of abstraction. At the compu-
tational level, hierarchical models of motor con-
trol such as HMOSAIC postulate the existence of
at least three layers of motor representations: the
goal, the sequence of movements, and the ele-
ments of movements (Jeannerod, 1995; Wolpert
et al., 2003). The goal is the highest and the most
abstract level (e.g. to get a drink of water). It
activates the planning of the dynamic sequence of
movements to perform in order to achieve the
goal (e.g. to pour the water in the glass, to grasp
the glass, and to bring it to the mouth). The
precise kinematics of the sequence of movements
is then computed taking account of the agent’s
body and the surrounding context (e.g. to stretch
the arm for 20 cm, to make a 5 cm grip aperture,
to raise the arm with an elbow angle of 458). We
suggest that these three levels correspond to what
we call prior intention, intention in action, and
motor command (Table 1).
In parallel with the motor hierarchy, there is an
embodiment hierarchy. Motor representations
take account in more or less detail of bodily
information necessary to perform the intended
action. Bodily information can be either general
(e.g. which limbs to move) or specific to the agent
(e.g. the size of the limbs, joint angles or hand
position) (Wolpert et al., 2003). In the latter case,
the body state is not shared between the agent
and the observer, who differ in their size and in
their posture. SRA experiments can provide
evidence about the level of embodiment at which
sharing occurs, and this can therefore give em-
pirical data about the level of abstraction.
Do SRA take into account precise bodily
parameters? It has been shown that action
observation leads to somatotopic activation of
the premotor cortex (Buccino et al., 2001). In
addition, the motor facilitation effect of action
observation is muscle-specific (Fadiga, Fogassi,
Pavesi, and Rizzolatti, 1995). Consequently, SRA
encode bodily movements, and not merely ab-
stract goals. However, SRA cannot represent the
precise bodily kinematics in all its details, as
shown by several experimental results. Csibra
(2007) notes that only 1941% of mirror neurons
are classified as ‘strictly congruent’ (di Pellegrino
et al., 1992; Ferrari, Gallese, Rizzolatti, & Fogassi,
2003; Gallese et al., 1996; Gallese, Fogassi,
Fadiga, & Rizzolatti, 2002). Strict means that
they fire only for observed actions of exactly the
same type (e.g. not just grasping, but grasping
with a particular hand configuration). The major-
ity of mirror neurons fire when the observed
action is ‘‘broadly congruent’’: they can respond
to movements as different as grasping with the
mouth and grasping with the hand (Gallese et al.
1996). What matters is the motor repertoire, not
the individual body that performs the actions
(Calvo-Merino et al., 2006). Somatotopic activa-
tion is indeed found even if the movement is
TABLE 1
Three levels of motor representation
Abstraction Embodiment
Prior intention: the goal  
Intention in action: dynamic
sequence of movements
 
Motor command: kinematics
of elements of movements
 
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performed by nonconspecifics such as monkeys or
dogs (Buccino et al., 2004), or robots (Gazzola
et al., 2007; Press, Bird, Flach, & Heyes, 2005).
What matters is that the observer can perform a
functionally equivalent movement.
Furthermore, as we have seen, SRA are
activated by the observation of biomechanically
impossible movements (Avenanti et al., 2007;
Costantini et al., 2005; Romani et al., 2005). It
should be noted, however, that these so-called
impossible movements are rather the exaggera-
tion of physiologically possible movements, and
thus share a number of features with them.
Activation of SRA by biomechanically impossible
stimuli may thus arise because specific bodily
detail is lost when SRA match actions across
bodies. Along the same lines, it was shown that
two aplasic individuals born without hands acti-
vated regions of the mirror system involved in
mouth and foot execution when observing hand
movements (Gazzola, Rizzolatti, Wicker, & Key-
sers, 2007). In contrast with Buccino et al. (2001,
2004), the activation was not somatotopic. To put
it another way, SRA can and do abstract actions
despite intersubjective differences, even when
these differences are extreme.
A last argument against fully embodied SRA
comes from the mirror neurons literature, and
points towards the same conclusion as Gazzola et
al. (2007). Some mirror neurons responded to the
observation of tool-using actions (e.g. grasping
food with a stick), although the monkeys them-
selves were unable to perform these actions (e.g.
they grasped the food with their hand) (Ferrari,
Rozzi, & Fogassi, 2005). In this case, the kine-
matics of the two actions differs in important
respects. For example, the direction and speed of
motion, the angles between the joints, etc. cannot
be shared in such cases.
To sum up, we consider that SRA do not
represent movements in all their bodily para-
meters. SRA match not only the observed action
to an executable action, but also someone else’s
body to one’s own body. SRA may (Buccino
et al., 2001) or may not (Ferrari et al., 2005;
Gazzola et al., 2007) match spatial anatomical
detail across bodies. However, they clearly cannot
match dynamic information about muscular
forces across bodies, since they are activated by
observation of nonconspecifics’ actions (Buccino
et al., 2004). This is not so surprising given the
fact that the agent’s body almost always differs
from the observer’s body (e.g. in length and
strength of the limbs). We know that children
can imitate adults although their bodies differ
completely. What they extract from the observed
movements is the sequence of movements, not the
way this sequence is implemented in the agent’s
particular body. And what they reproduce is not
the precise kinematics, but the sequence of move-
ments (e.g. to reach a target like the adult, they
stretch their arm more than the adult). In fact,
having access to such a level of bodily details
would be useless as they are of no help if one
wants to reproduce the movement, overtly or
covertly.
Does this mean, however, that SRA represent
disembodied abstract goals (Gazzola et al., 2007)?
It does not seem so. Mirror activations are
somatotopically organized. SRA represent the
bodily sequence of movements that best corre-
sponds in the observer’s motor repertoire. If the
observed effector is not available to the agent
(e.g., the hand for the aplasic patients and the
stick for the monkeys), then the motor system
selects another effector able to perform the
observed movement. However, by default, it is
the same effector that is activated. One may even
speculate that if the aplasic patients had phantom
hands, one would find mirror activation in the
region involved in hand movements. It was shown
indeed that there are differences in action ob-
servation in aplasic patients with and without
phantom limbs (Funk, Shiffrar, & Brugger, 2005).
They found that an aplasic individual with a
phantom hand showed kinesthetically modulated
perceptions of apparent hand motion, similar to
controls, while an aplasic without a phantom did
not. Thus, when the hand representation is pre-
sent in the cortex, it appears to mediate action
observation.
Let us now consider the level of abstraction of
SRA. The classical view of mirror neurons has
emphasized the congruence between the percep-
tual and the motor properties of the action: a
neuron that is tuned for execution of a specific
motor action shows visual selectivity for obser-
ving the same action (Gallese, 2003). Action
understanding through SRA would be based on
a one-to-one matching. Mirror neurons were said
to be a replicative mechanism, which directly
duplicates in a motor code the perceptual proper-
ties of actions. Recent evidence, however, has
argued against such replicative mechanisms (for
review, see Csibra (2007) and Jacob (2008)). On
this view, SRA are far from being a faithful
reproduction of what is observed. There is no
428 DE VIGNEMONT AND HAGGARD
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
de
 V
ig
ne
mo
nt
, 
Fr
éd
ér
iq
ue
] 
At
: 
09
:2
4 
3 
No
ve
mb
er
 2
00
8
one-to-one matching. But how far up should we
go in the level of abstraction?
Rizzolatti, Fadiga, Fogassi, & Gallese (2002)
make the distinction between low-level and high-
level resonance mechanisms. The former encodes
the specific movements; the latter encodes the
global goal-directed action itself. The authors
suggest that mirror neurons involve high-level
intentional resonance, as suggested by Fogassi
et al. (2005) and Iacoboni et al. (2005).5 This
would seem to exclude the possibility of SRA
operating at the most specific motor level, but it
does not disentangle between intention in action
and prior intention. Prior intentions differ from
intentions in action in that they can be achieved
by different means, whereas intentions in action
specify in more detail the selected mean. To argue
that SRA detect prior intentions, one would need
to show similar brain activations when the dis-
played movements are completely different,
although the global goal remains the same. As
far as we know, this is not the case. In addition,
access to the prior intention based on the
observation of the movements only is difficult
or impossible (Jacob & Jeannerod, 2005).
We described at the beginning of this section
three levels of action representations: the prior
intention, the intention in action, and the motor
command. These levels should not viewed as a
conceptual tree-like structure where one can
derive the most abstract level from the most
concrete level (e.g. a human is a mammal). In the
case of action, this sort of derivation (e.g. grasping
is for eating) is not possible, because many
possible prior intentions can correspond to a
single specific movement (Jacob & Jeannerod,
2005). A movement may be made for any of a
number of purposes (Anscombe, 1957). It is thus
difficult to directly ‘‘read’’ the prior intention
from someone else’s behavior, which remains
ambiguous without further information.
SRA, by definition, begin with the observation
of an action. The raw information is therefore a
dynamic sequence of specific movements. We
suggest that the motor system can abstract from
the specific bodily parameters of the agent’s
movement to represent the underlying intention
in action. But to go as far as the prior intention,
one would need to abstract beyond the intention
in action to a global goal. We agree with Jacob
and Jeannerod that such abstraction is not possi-
ble based only on motor information. Therefore,
one cannot have access to the prior intention
based on the observation of the movements only.
We will illustrate our point here by using the
key example of imitation. We define imitation as
the reproduction of the goal of someone else’s
action. We assume that SRA contribute to imita-
tion, not least because of their role in under-
standing action goals. There is currently
considerable debate about the true nature and
cognitive significance of imitation, but we will
remain neutral within this debate (Rizzolatti
et al., 2002; Wohlschla¨ger & Bekkering, 2002;
Brass & Heyes, 2005). We claim that sharing
intentions in action is a minimal prerequisite of
imitation. Imitation thus requires being sensitive
to the dynamic sequence of movements that
constitutes the action. In the absence of a
common intention in action, imitation would be
merely a kind of emulation or mimicry, a repro-
duction of the motor outcome by the observer’s
own means. Does imitation also require the
understanding of prior intentions? In some cases,
there might be no prior intention, as for mean-
ingless gestures, yet one is still able to imitate
them. However, when there is a prior intention, is
it also shared?
Meltzoff (1995) claims that children as young
as 18 months are able to ‘‘read’’ the underlying
prior intention (i.e. grasping the stick) from the
observation of the attempted but failed version of
the action (the demonstrator’s hand slipping
several times). They did perform the target action
correctly, even though they had only observed the
failed movement. Interestingly, Meltzoff’s study
was conducted in a way that made the goal
meaningful (grasping a stick by the two ends),
while the failed movement observed by the
children was meaningless (clumsy slipping move-
ments). Melzoff claimed that they understood the
demonstrator’s prior intention. However, one
could also suggest that they detected the affor-
dances provided by the stick (e.g. meaningful
actions that one can perform with a stick) and
reproduced the action most similar to the ob-
served movement, independently of the demon-
strator’s prior intention. It would be easy to check
this interpretation experimentally. If the children
5 For instance, Fogassi et al. (2005) assumed that the
content of the intention detected by the monkey is something
like ‘‘to eat’’, while it could be as well described as ‘‘to place in
the mouth’’. It would be interesting to know what would
happen if the monkey had to place either something eatable or
something non-eatable in the mouth (hoping that everything is
not eatable by monkeys). Then there would really be a
similarity of intention in action with a difference of prior
intentions.
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read the prior intention from the movements
observed, then they should be able to do so
whether the act is meaningful or meaningless. For
instance, they should be able to detect the
demonstrator’s prior intention to have his hand
slipping and missing the stick end. But one would
be very surprised if they could do so based on the
observed movements. The problem with this
study is that it confuses two different notions:
meaningful and intentional.
We suggest that intentions in action already
represent a dynamic sequence of movements as
meaningful or meaningless and that we do not
need to go as far as the prior intention to grasp
this dimension. However, it is important to
understand here that the fact that imitation
requires a shared intention in action does not
imply that imitation has to be to a perfect slavish
copy of a set of movements independently of the
global intention. The intention in action should
not be confused with the motor command. It is
more articulated, linking the set of movements
into meaningful sequences when possible.
A further characteristic of imitation sheds new
light on SRA. Imitation is a prepotent response
tendency, which needs to be inhibited. Subjects
make more errors and are slower to perform a
movement when they watch an incongruent
movement (Brass, Bekkering, Wohlscha¨ger, &
Prinz, 2000). For instance, subjects move their
index finger while they see the little finger
moving. The observation of the little finger
movement induces the subjects to do the same
and they need to inhibit this tendency in order to
perform the task. However, some patients with
frontal lesions are no longer able to inhibit and
compulsively imitate others (Lhermitte, 1983;
Brass, Derrfuss, Matthes-von Cramon, & von
Cramon, 2003). Consequently, unless inhibited,
the activation of the SRA during observation
automatically leads to the execution of the
corresponding action. It needs to be inhibited if
the agent intends to perform another movement,
or no movement at all.
In contrast with the inhibition mechanisms
involved in non-imitative situations such as the
Stroop task, the inhibition of imitation activates
the anterior fronto-median cortex and the tem-
poral-parietal junction (Brass, Derrfuss, & von
Cramon, 2005). Both areas are known to be
involved in the sense of agency and in perspec-
tive-taking. Brass and colleagues (2005) claim
that the distinction between internally generated
and externally triggered motor representations
plays a key role to prevent us from imitating
someone else’s movements. To put it another way,
my brain incorporates a specific process to ensure
that I do not imitate your movements. This
process is adaptive and appropriate because
your movements are yours, and do not match
my own prior intentions.
One consequence of the phenomenon of
inhibition of imitation is that SRA are causally
efficient: they can play a significant role in action
generation. We have argued that the main causal
role of SRA is in supporting imitation of goal-
directed action. Indeed, according to Searle
(1983), both kinds of intention play a causal
role: the prior intention causes the intention in
action, which in turn causes bodily movements.
Neuroscience has challenged the view that con-
scious prior intentions do actually play a causal
role (Libet, 1985), but these results have no
relevance for unconscious intentions in action.
Causal efficacy would even be part of the content
of intentions in action, which are ‘‘causally self-
referential’’ (Searle, 1983, p. 93). It is part of the
content of an intention in action that this inten-
tion in action causes certain bodily movements
(see Pacherie (2000) for discussion). If SRA do
represent intentions in action, then, they include
causal efficacy as well as the causally self-refer-
ential component.
SRA do indeed contribute to the observers
themselves generating the action they observe, at
least in imitation contexts. They correspond to the
level in the motor hierarchy where action ob-
servation interacts with action execution, as
shown for instance by interference effects and
imitation inhibition effects. Observing someone
else moving automatically activates the intention
in action associated with this movement. This in
turn automatically induces the fulfillment of this
intention by virtue of the causal efficacy of the
intention, unless it is inhibited. Such inhibition
would in fact be the default state, and might be
released only when the agent has the correspond-
ing prior intention. Thus, an important part of
higher motor cognition would be a tonic inhibi-
tion to keep SRA at bay, and to prevent our
behavior being captured by others during social
interaction. This inhibition is imposed by top-
down influence outside the SRA system itself.
Simulating an observed action is so close to doing
it that a level of inhibition is required. However,
it is interesting to note that in Brass’s studies,
subjects had the prior intention to move. What
was affected by the observation of the incongru-
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ent movement was the selection of the performed
movement (e.g. which index finger I move), not
the decision to perform an action.
To sum up, SRA must represent (i) bodily
movements, independently of the agent’s or the
observer’s specific bodily parameters to allow
transfer across individuals in imitation, (ii) the
intermediate level of the planning of the dynamic
sequence of movements. We consider therefore
that intentions in action are a good candidate for
SRA. Although the mirror neuron community
has always considered SRA to be more about
action understanding than about imitation, we
think that this is not incompatible with our view.
We are defining imitation not as slavish mimicry,
but as reproducing a movement with some
representation of the immediate goal, and that
requires understanding what the observed se-
quence of movement is.
CONCLUSION
We have seen that SRA are causally efficient, in
the sense that they tend to make me imitate.
Consequently, they must be representations
within the motor system, rather than just a
conceptual label that I apply to your action in
the same way I think about all other moving
objects in the world. SRA must therefore involve
intentional representations of action prior to the
dispatch of a motor command. One should not,
however, go too far up in the motor hierarchy.
SRA must occur at a level indeterminate enough
to apply to movements performed by different
bodies, but also determinate enough to be ex-
tracted from the mere observation of movements.
Intentions in action, defined as the planning of
the dynamic sequence of elementary movements
that causally triggers the motor command, appear
then to be the best candidate for SRA.
Manuscript accepted 11 March 2008
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